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Porträtt av Erik Wengström. Foto.

Erik Wengström

Studierektor forskarutbildningen, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Professor

Porträtt av Erik Wengström. Foto.

Performance Incentives in Education: The Role of Goal Mismatch

Författare

  • Pol Campos-Mercade
  • Petra Thiemann
  • Erik Wengström

Summary, in English

We conduct a field experiment studying how financial incentives for achieving specific course grades affect university students, whether effects vary by ability, and whether allowing students to choose their goals improves outcomes. We find that incentives negatively affect performance, particularly among low-ability students assigned high goals. Survey data suggest this negative impact arises from a mismatch between assigned goals and students’ abilities, distorting their reference points and expectations. Allowing students to choose their goals partially mitigates this effect but does not eliminate it. Our results caution against incentives in education and highlight a novel mechanism through which incentives can backfire.

Avdelning/ar

  • Nationalekonomiska institutionen
  • Centrum för ekonomisk demografi
  • LU profilområde: Naturlig och artificiell kognition
  • Centre for Retail Research at Lund University

Publiceringsår

2025-05-07

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Working Papers

Avvikelse

2025:5

Dokumenttyp

Working paper

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • Incentives
  • Performance goals
  • Academic performance
  • Field experiment
  • C93
  • D90
  • I22
  • I23

Aktiv

Published