Tax avoidance and state ownership : The case of Sweden

Summary, in English

We propose a simple theoretical model for how a company with both private and state shareholders decides on its optimal tax policy. The model predicts that even in the absence of state shareholding, a company will not always pick a tax policy that minimizes taxes. Conversely, majority state ownership will generally not result in zero tax avoidance. Using panel regressions on the entire population of state-owned as well as publicly listed Swedish companies from 2000–2019, we find that a one standard deviation increase in state ownership increases corporate tax payments by around 14%.

• Författare: Axel Hilling; Frederik Lundtofte; Niklas Sandell; Amanda Sonnerfeldt; Anders Wilhelmsson
• Avdelning/ar: Institutionen för handelsrätt; Redovisning och finans; Företagsekonomiska institutionen; Nationalekonomiska institutionen
• Publiceringsår: 2021-09-01
• Språk: Engelska
• Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Economics Letters
• Volym: 208
• Länkar: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110063
• Dokumenttyp: Artikel i tidskrift
• Förlag: Elsevier
• Ämne: Economics; Law (excluding Law and Society)
• Nyckelord: Tax avoidance; Ownership structure; State ownership; H26; G32
• Status: Published
• Projekt: Tax reporting for a sustainable society
• ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt: ISSN: 0165-1765