Erik Wengström
Studierektor forskarutbildning, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Professor
Delegation Decisions in Finance
Författare
Summary, in English
We run an online experiment with finance professionals and subjects from the general population (clients) to examine drivers and implications of clients' delegation decisions. We find that clients favor delegation to investment algorithms, followed by delegation to finance professionals with aligned incentives and lastly to those with fixed incentives. We also show that trust in investment algorithms or money managers (finance professionals), respectively, and clients' propensity to shift blame on others increases the likelihood of delegation, whereas own decision-making quality is associated with a decrease. In measuring the implications of clients' delegation decisions, we report high variability among finance professionals' perceptions of clients' preferred risk levels. We show that this results in overlaps in portfolio risk across risk-levels of clients, indicating problems of risk communication between clients and their money managers.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2020-11-20
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Working Papers
Issue
2020:24
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 719 kB
- Download statistics
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- experimental finance
- finance professionals
- delegation decisions
- C93
- G11
- G41
Aktiv
Published