Tommy Andersson
Professor
Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, Under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2008
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
350-354
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volym
56
Issue
3
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Elsevier
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Coalitionally strategy-proofness
- Fairness
- Indivisibles
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0165-4896