Tommy Andersson
Professor
Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2018
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
41-59
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Games and Economic Behavior
Volym
107
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
0899-8256
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- rationing price equilibrium
- (extended) english price sequences
- iterative English auction rule
- C78
- D44
- D45
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0899-8256