Tommy Andersson
Professor
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
Författare
Summary, in English
In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2020-07
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
937-965
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volym
122
Issue
3
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Wiley-Blackwell
Ämne
- International Migration and Ethnic Relations
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1467-9442